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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant asks that the finding of g1'.''.t 
be reversed and the complaint dismissed or in the 
alternative that the case be remanded for a new tria;, 
-iii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Respondents 
vs. 





BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
-1-
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
The defendant, Stanley Wayne 
Baran, was charged with robbery in viol-
ation of title 76, chapter 51, section 1 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, charging that 
on January 10, 1969, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, he robbed Corey Sharp and 
Rebecca Luras. Defendant has filed this 
Appeal seeking to have the Court dismiss 
the charges against this defendant, or 
remand the case for a new trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER 
COURT 
The petitioner-defendant was con-
victed by a jury on September 18, 1969, 
of robbery. Judge Gordon R. Hall heard 
the matter. Defendant was sentenced to 
serve six months in Farmington County 
Jail, to repay $500.00, and to remain on 
probation for two years. Approximately 
-2-
one month of the jail sentence has be 2 n 
served. 
FACTS 
The petitioner-defendant was 
jointly charged with robbery in violLlt-
ion of 76-51-1 UCA in a complaint before 
James S. Sawaya, City Judge of Murray, 
alleging that Stanley Wayne Baran and 
Brian Frazier, on January 10, 1969 in 
Salt Lake County, robbed Corey Sharp and 
Rebecca Luras. Bail of $15,000 was 
reduced to $5,000. Defendant demurred 
to the complaint and a preliminary hear-
ing was set for June 30, 1969. The 
demurrer allegin3that the complaint 
failed to state a location, time or part-
iculars sufficient to enable defendant 
to prepare a defense, was denied. On 
June 30, 1969, the court without hearing 
denied an application to change venue and 
-3-
denied defendant a reporter. Testimony 
was received and the court on its own 
motion continued the case to July 1, 
1969. On that date, further testimony 
was taken. Defendant recorded both days 
of testimony. The case was taken under 
advisement to July 2, 1969, on which 
date defendant was bound over to stand 
trial. Defendant's arraignment came 
before Judge D. Frank Wilkins on July 
14, 1969. A motion to quash was filed 
and heard on July 18, 1969, but no 
transcript of that hearing was forwarded. 
The motion was denied and on July 21, 
1969, defendant plead Not Guilty and 
filed a demand for speedy trial. On 
July 28, 1969, defendant filed Notice of 
Alibi. The case came on for trial August 
18, 1969, and was continued, over 
vigorous protest of defendant, as defen-
-4-
dant wanted both trials held one after 
the other (Judge Hall heard the first 
felony charge which the jury returned a 
Not Guilty verdict on.) The case was 
reset September 18, 1970, and trial 
commenced that day. Defendant was pre-
judiced by the delay as he was without 
funds, a witness moved and was lost, the 
defendant was jailed unduly for a mis-
demeanor and could not assist in prepar-
ation of his defense. He was kept jailed 
and brought to the court in irons before 
the jury, and a guard kept present at all 
times, before the same judge who lost 
the first case. 
The defense asked that the court 
rule in advance that no reference be made 
in the course of the trial to the fact 
that defendant had been a police officer 
formerly charged, due to the adverse 
-5-
€ffect on the jury of extensive adverse 
publicity. The court was asked 
not to question the jurors on what they 
had read if such evidence were excluded 
(T83[10] ). The court refused to rule 
on the former (T 82 [2]) and then 
advised the jury Mr. Baran was a police 
officer (T 87;20). Having so advised 
them, the court refused to enquire 
privately what each had read (T 88;12), 
(T 94;1) or if the neighbors knew of 
the divorce of defendant with its hard 
words (T 96; 1-30). 
The defense challenged the jury 
panel which consisted of middle aged, 
caucasions, selected at that time from 
the tax rolls. (Note: the court has 
since changed the method of selection, 
taking them from the voting rolls). 
The jury panel consisted of 16 persons 
-6-
of whom one lived six houses away frcm 
defendant's estranged wife, eight of 
whom had been previously robbed, sorne ac: 
many as three times, and two of that 
eight who had read all about defendant's 
other case in the papers. The court 
refused to grant a hearing on the panel. 
Three persons who were in these catag-
ories survived the challenges. One wan-
ted to be excused for business and had 
to be challenged when the court would 
not, and thus the composition of the 
panel ended up with considerable bias 
against defendant, as one other had been 
on a recent case with the prosecutor, and 
1 indicated an affirmative to bias and 
was not excused (T 90;13) and the court 
cut defense off repeatedly. (T 93; 4) I 
( T 94; 9) , (TS 7; 21) ( T 81; 11) etc. 
-7-
Tile State's witnesses testified that on January 10, 
19G9, at 10 P. M., 2 persons, one of whom was 
C..:. ztld Rose, came into a service station at 11th 
1=;.i st and 17th South in Salt Lake County and took 
with gun and cro\vbar cash receipts of about $300 
to $550 and $2 from a wallet. Mr. Harwood saw 
2 n1en enter and scoop money up and another pick 
t 1-:ie:rn up in a 196 3 Ford and followed until he was 
fired upon. {Exhibit 4) None of them identified 
defendant as being there. Mr. Lewis had his car 
stolen from Trailways Bus Depot at 9:10 P.M. and 
recovered it later with a stolen transistor and hole 
shot in the rear window. The prosecutor then put 
in evidence of a burgulary not related to this offense 
(T 132;17) and the court refused a mistrial {Tl33:6). 
Mr. Lewis testified defendant worked one day at 
this station 2 weeks before the robbery and the 
Judge refused to instruct on stricken evidence on 
cash register operations. 
-8-
Clare Rose then testified that at 11 P. M. on 
January 10, 1969, Gerald, Frazier, and defen-
dant were at her home, defendant handed Gerry 
money and said 11 You 1re in it. 11 and threatened 
her life and that of her children. The Court re-
fused to allow a recording of prior testimony to 
impeach, alledging poor quality, although the 
recording is clear enough. Police Officer Paul 
Rogers testified that on January 10, 1969 at llP.!-.1. i 
Stan Baran was with him at the Police Station 
(T 299:19). Evidence of items taken in the robbery 
and found at the Rose home was stipulated. (Exhibit! 
1, 2, and 3.) 
The only testimony linking defendant to the 
robbery came from a 2-time convicted felon, 
Gerald Rose who was identified by witnesses at 
the crime and granted immunity from 2 new felonie: 
for implicating a policeman whom he did not like. 
-9-
The prosecution withheld evidence of the 
from the jury (T 188: 15). He 
placed Defendant and another person against 
whom the prosecutor elected not to proceed 
after he denied being in the robbery and 
produced an (T 282:30) Rose testi-
fied that at 7 P.M. he picked both up on 
south Temple and they took an hour to drive 
for gas at North Beck Street (T 211:25) at 
8 P.M. and while looking for a car to steal 
went to three (3) places to steal waiting 
at a cafe at 9 P.M. and then over 1/2 hour 
waiting thereafter at a theatre; and on 
(T 217:25) dropped Rose's car off at 9; and 
at 9:10 the car of Mr. Lewis' was stolen. 
Defendant and four witnesses testified as to 
his alibi and the jury chose not to believe 
them or the supposed co-defendant Frazier 
and his alibi. 
-10-
The prosecutor was then allowed to place a.i 
exotic dancer on the stand who said Defendant sp 0;, 
of knowing something of the case, but Prosecuti'in 
withheld from Defendant and the jury a recorded con1, 
I 
I 
sation whereby Defendant communicated his suspicioj 
of Rose to the police before his arrest. 




STATEMENT OF POINTS AND ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE ONLY EVIDENCE CONNECTING DEF-
ENDANT TO THE ROBBERY WAS A STATEMENT 
OF AN ACCOMPLICE WHICH STATEMENT WAS 
NOT CORROBORATED. 
STATUTORY REQUIREMENT 
The law in Utah is very clear with 
regards to the requirement that a defen-
dant not be convicted on the uncorrobor-
ated testimony of an accomplice. A law 
has been on the books since Utah's territ-
orial days which clearly states this 
requirement. In its present form it reads: 
CONVICTION ON TESTIMONY OF ACCOM-
PLIC: - A conviction shall not be 
had on the testimony of an accom-
plice unless he is corroborated by 
other evidence which in itself and 
without the aid of the testimony 
of the accomplice tends to connect 
the defendant with the committing 
of the offence; and the corrobor-
ation shall not be sufficient, if 
it merely shows the commission of 
-12-
the offence or the circumstances 
therE:of. 77-31-18 UCA ( 1953) 
DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW 
Despite the clarity of the statute, 
a great body of case law has developed in 
Utah and other states with regards to the 
exact requirements of corroboration in 
such matters. In an effort to aid Utah 
courts in determining what is sufficient 
corroboration, the Utah Supreme Court has 
adopted some tests which, although they 
have originated in other courts, have 
been used over the years as guidelines in 
Utah. In 1931, the Utah Supreme Court 
described both of these tests: 
"The corroborative evidence need 
not be sufficient in itself to 
sustain a conviction but it must 
in and of itself tend to implic-
ate and connect the accused with 
the commission of the crime charged 
and not be consistent with his 
innocence. It is insufficient if 
it merely casts a grave suspicion 
-13-
on the accused." State vs. 
Laris 78 Utah 183, 2 P.2d. 243 
( 1931) 
In this same case, the Court adopLcd 
another test, citing with approval the 
test used in Welden vs. State, 10 Tex. 
App. 400:-
"Eliminate from the case the evid-
ence of the accomplice, and then 
examine the evidence of the other 
witnesses with the view to ascer-
tain if there be inculpatory 
evidence - evidence tending to 
connect the defendant with the 
offence. If there is, the accom-
plice is corroborated; if there is 
no inculpatory evidence, there is 
not corroboration, though it may 
be corroborated in regard to any 
number of facts sworn to by him." 
ID 
In a further effort to clarify this 
area of law, various Supreme Court decis-
ions have added additional explanatory 
matter. For example, in 1927 the Supreme 
Court in Utah held that:-
"The corroborative evidence required 
-14-
by the statute need not be suff-
icient in itself to support a convic-
tion but it must implicate the 
accused in the offence and not be con-
sistent with his innocence. It is in-
sufficient if it merely casts a grave 
suspicion on the accused." State v. 
Lay, 38 Utah 143, 10 Pac. 987 
(Emphasis added). 
In California it was held that the corr-
oborative evidence was not sufficient if it 
required further interpretation and direction 
to give it value. People v. Brady 382 P. 
2d. 591, 59C. 2d. 855, 51 Cal. Rptr. 471, 
96 ALR 2nd 1178. 
As noted previously, despite apparent 
clarity of the statute involved, a great body 
of case law has developed, touching on the 
requirement of corroborative testimony. The 
problem in most cases seems to be whether 
the alleged corroborative testimony was suff-
icient. The defendant in most cases contends 
that there was no corroborative evidence at 
all or if there was any such corroborative 
-15-
evidence, was insufficient. A Utah case 
held that:-
"While it is a question for the 
jury to determine whether the 
corroborative evidence is suff-
icient, in connection with the 
testimony of the accomplice to 
justify conviction, yet unless 
there is corroborative evidence 
of the material fact tending to 
connect the defendant with the 
commission of the crime, the 
court should direct the verdict 
for the defendant." State v. 
Somers 97 Utah 132, 90P. 2d. 
273 {1939). 
In many cases, the prosecutor has 
attempted to corroborate the testimony of 
the accomplice and has, in fact, corrobor-
ated his testimony with regard to much of 
the accomplice's story. However, as poin- , 
ted out in State vs. Somers, supra, the 
corroborative evidence must be of a mater-
ial fact, an element of the crime. It must ' 
tend to connect the defendant with the 
corrunission of the crime and not merely 
corroborate certain points of the accom-
--16-
olice's story. 
As pointed out in the State vs. 
Laras, supra, the corroborative evidence 
must tend to implicate the defendant with 
the crime charged, not merely some crimin-
al act or some suspicious behaviour. As 
the Court said, it is insufficient if the 
corroborative evidence merely casts a 
grdve suspicion on the accused. The 
courts have required that this corrobor-
ative evidence actually connect the accused 
with the crime in question. It is not 
sufficient if the evidence relates to 
some other criminal act or even an appar-
ently similar criminal act, but it must 
relate to the crime in question, the crime 
charged. Repeating again the second test 
cited by the court in State v. Laras, the 
corroborative evidence should be looked 
at completely apart from the testimony 
-17--
of the accomplice, and the connection 
with the defendant to the crime charged 
must be solely on the basis of this corr-
oborative evidence. If the defendant's 
action, in light of the alleged corrob-
orative testimony can be seen to be con-
sistent with his innocence, the courts 
have held that this corroborative evidence 
is not sufficient and have required a 
directed verdict in favor of him. 
INSUFFICIENT CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE 
In State v. Butterfield, cited 
supra, the alleged corroborative evidence 
was the finding of stolen property in 
the defendant's house. However, because 
the defendant's brother was also charged 
with the crime, and since the court 
assumed that they both lived in the same 
house, the finding of the stolen property 
was consistent with the defendant's inno-
-1&-
cence and was not sufficient to convict 
him the crime. 
State v. Somers, cited supra: 
"While it has been held that this 
corroborative evidence may be 
slight *** and may be established 
by circumstantial other than 
direct evidence ***, yet the evid-
ence must do more than create a 
mere suspicion as to the defendant's 
guilt .. It must tend to connect 
the defendant with the commission 
of the offence *** and it is not 
sufficient corroboration to estab-
lish a motive merely." ID at 274. 
In this arson case, the evidence 
showed that the defendant was with the 
accomplice: 
"On the evening in question at or 
near the time the fire started, 
and in the vicinity of the build-
ing. In the present case, this 
evidence is entirely consistent 
with the defendant's innocence 
*** Somers does not deny he was 
with Elgin (the accomplice) on the 
evening of the alleged arson, in 
fact, he admits that the two were 
together for some time during the 
evening, but his story which is 
corroborated by other witnesses, 
is that he left Elgin at about 
9:30 p.m. and went up town, where 
he was with others some time before 
the fire alarm sounded: State v. 
;.19-
Somers 90 Pac. 2nd at 274. 
The Court here held that evidence 
of highly suspicious activity on the part 
of the defendant, together with the test- , 
imony of the accomplice, was insufficient 
to convict him of the crime. The same 
case notes even further - quoting again 
from the case:-
"Appellant's conduct while he 
was in jail in threatening anyone 
who might testify against him 
might arouse suspicion that he had 
had something to do with the fire, 
but mere suspicion is not sufficient 
to corroborate an accomplice. And 
this circumstance is consistent 
with the desire to prevent Grames, 
who was in jail with him, from 
threatened false testimony of the 
latter." ID at 274. 
In a recent Arizona case, it was 
held that there was insufficient corrob-
orative evidence when the testimony showed 
that the defendant and two accomplices 
left together on the night of the burglary 
in question and returned together later 
in the same evening. Further testimony 
-20-
'Jy a gas station attendant showed that 
the two accomplices who were known to 
him, plus a third whom he did not know, 
stopped at a station at the night of the 
burglary, and additional testimony of 
the owner of the burglarized store that 
the defendant had previously worked at 
the store and was thus familiar with the 
layout and operation of the store did 
not adequately connect the defendant with 
the commission of the crime and were 
insufficient to corroborate the testimony 
of the two accomplices. State v. Gold-
thorpe 96 Ariz. 350, 395 P. 2nd 708 (1964) 
Mere suspicion was not enough in 
the 1968 Utah case where the Sheriff's 
testimony tended to establish that foot-
prints found near the scene of the crime 
had pointed toes and subsequent testimony 
of an accomplice that the defendant had 
-21-
been wearing shoes with pointed 
These facts were not found sufficient 
to corroborate the testimony of an 
accomplice. State v. Olsen 21 Utah 
2nd 128, 441 P. 2nd 707 (1968). 
An Oklahoma case held that evidence 
sufficient to merely show the commission 
of the crime was insufficient corrobor-
ation. Rodrigues v. State, Okla. 406 
P. 2nd. 506. 
In California it was held that 
evidence showing the opportunity of the 
defendant to conunit the offence was not 
sufficient evidence to corroborate the 
testimony of an accomplice. People v. 




It will be helpful to examine 
several examples of what was sufficient 
-22-
evidence to corroborate the testimony 
of an accomplice. The finding of stolen 
goods on the defendant's property has 
generally held to be sufficient corrob-
orative evidence. In State v. Vigil, 
123 Utah 495, 260 P. 2nd 539 (1953) the 
defendant's testimony had been that a 
certain suitcase was his. The suitcase 
was later proved to have been stolen. 
This evidence was sufficient corrobor-
ation to the testimony of an accomplice. 
In a 1942 case, State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 
365, 120 P. 2nd 285 (1942) in which the 
Mayor of Salt Lake and several city 
officials were charged with conspiracy 
to accept a bribe, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that corroborative evidence may 
consist in the admissions of the accused. 
In State v. Bruner, 106 Utah 49, 
146 P. 2nd. 302 (1944) the finding of 
stolen goods on defendant was held to 
be sufficient corroborative evidence 
even though the defendant testified that 
he merely recovered the goods for the 
purpose of returning them to the owner. 
In a 1963 Utah case, it was held 
that the defendant's admission of being 
in the area of the crime, the finding 
of a shotgun and nylon stocking allegedly 
worn on the head of the defendant and 
his accomplice along the route, together 
with independent testimony by a witness 
in another state that the defendant had 
admitted to him that he shot a man in 
Utah, under identical circumstances, 
were held to be sufficient corroboration 
to the testimony of an accomplice. 
State v. Cazda, 14 Utah 2nd 266, 382 P. 
2nd 407 (1963). 
In State v. Simpson, 120 Utah 596, 
-24--
236 P. 2nd 1077 (1951) the defendant 
was convicted on testimony of an accom-
plice which was corroborated by evidence 
of flight and attempted concealment from 
a police officer, as well as attempts 
to sell the stolen merchandise. 
EXAMPLES FROM OTHER JURIS-
DICTIONS 
To recite the various fact sit-
uations discussed by the courts of other 
jurisdictions would take several volumes. 
However, it will not be out of place to 
examine a few of these, since most of 
the Western States have basically the 
same law as Utah. 
In an Oregon case, it was held 
that evidence tending to show that the 
defendant's automobile was found stuck 
in a mud hole next to a stolen safe 
and that a set of foot-tracks was found 
leading from the defendant's car to a 
-2'5-
place where a coin box from the safe was 
found, was sufficient corroboration for 
the testimony of an accomplice. State 
v. Cheek, 240 Or. 323 41 P. 2nd 27. 
In an Alaska case, the evidence 
of the defendant's fingerprints found 
in the building, was sufficient corrobor-
ation for the testimony of an accomplice. 
Braham v. State, Alaska, 376 P. 2nd 714. 
In Arizona, it was held that 
evidence showing flight by the defendant, 
his apprehension, as well as possession 
of the stolen property, was sufficient 
corroborative evidence. State v. Turner 
94 Ariz. 49, 383 P. 2nd 866. And in 
another Arizona case, evidence showing 
the fact that the truck of the defendant 
was at the scene of the crime as well 
as evidence that the defendant had 
transported stolen goods, was sufficient 
corroboration for the testimony of an 
accomplice. State v. Cope 438 P. 2nd 
442 7 Ariz. App. 295. 
In California, sufficient corrob-
orative evidence was found in the defen-
dant's admissions to a police officer, 
his attempt to make a false alibi, and 
his flight from a policeman. People v. 
Santo, 43 C. 2nd 319, 273 P. 2nd 249. 
Possession of the probable instrument 
of the crime was found to be sufficient 
corroborative evidence to warrant convic-
tion on the testimony of an accomplice 
in People v. Keen, 128 CA 2nd 520, 275 
P. 2nd 804. And the California Courts 
have held that evidence that the defen-
dant knew the value of furs stolen and 
that he surreptisiouly sold them at a 
lesser price, was sufficient corrobor-
ative evidence in People v. Shofstall 
56 CA 2nd 121 132 P. 2nd 48. 
-C.7- • 
SUMMARY 
The law in Utah is clear that 
conviction shall not be had on the tes-
timony of an accomplice unless he is 
corroborated by other evidence. Courts 
in Utah have enlarged upon this statut-
ory test and have held that the corrob-
orative evidence must connect the accused 
with the crime charged; that the corrob-
orative evidence must do more than create 
a mere suspicion as to the guilt of the 
defendant. The corroborative evidence 
must be looked at apart from the testim-
ony of the accomplice, and when so looked 
at, must not be consistent with the 
defendant's innocence. If the corrobor-
ative testimony does not connect the 
defendant with at least some material 
element of the crime charged and if it 
is consistent with the innocence of the 
defendant, Utah courts have required that 
-' 
direct verdict be granted in favor of the defendant 
;i.nd as the evidence in this case did not rise to the 
r.:::quired level, it was error not to direct a verdict 
for Defendant. 
POINT 2 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN PERMITTING PROSECUTION TO INTRO-
DUCE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR GUILTY 
FIN DING IN A MISDEMEANOR CASE AND OF OTHER 
CRIMES. 
It is a well established rule that in a criminal 
prosecution proof which shows or tends to show that 
the accused is guilty of the commission of other 
crimes at other times is incompetent and inadmiss-
able for the purpose of showing the commission of 
the crime charged (29 Am Jur 2d 366; Evidence, Sec. 
320, and cases cited therein.) 
The cited text states the philosophy to be 
prevention of a conviction by inference that one who 
c ommitts other crimes is likely to have committed 
that charged. This rule has been adopted in Utah. 
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(People v. Couglin, 13 Utah 58, 44 P. 94; State 
v. Gillies, 40 Utah 541, 123 P. 93; State v. Bowe.:, 
I 
43 Utah 111, 134 P. 623; State v. Mc Gowen, 66 Utah I 
223, 241 P. 314; State v. Gregarious, 81 Utah 33, 
16 P. 2d 893; State v. Anderton, 81 Utah 320, 17 
P. 2d 917; State v. Peterson, 83 Utah 74, 27 P.ZG: 
20; State v. Kappes, 100 Utah 274, 114 P.2d 20J; 
State v. Nemier, 106 Utah 307, 148 P.2d 327; and 
State v. McHenry, 7 Utah 2d 289, 323 P. 2d 710). 
There are exceptions to show a general scheme 
where one involves proving the other, to establish 
identity, to prove constitutive elements of the crime 
on trial, none of which are material here. 
The crimes elicited by prosecution include I 
dismissal as an officer on a prior charge resulting 
in a conviction of destruction of property a mis-
demeanor, theft of a radio, taking of pennies, con-




DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR AND 
IMP TIAL TRIAL. 
An accused is guaranteed a fair and impar-
tial trial by the Constitution of Utah (Art. I, Sec. 12). · 
To convict him otherwise is a violation of that con-
stitutional right. 
Defendant points to the following character -
istics: 
1. The Court assisted in prosecution of the 
case where no assistance was needed by advising the 
jury that Defendant was a discharged police officer, 
making the motion to exclude defense witnesses, in-
ad8quate questioning of the jury, failure to remand 
for preliminary hearing, failure to try the case when 
originally set, holding defendant in jail during and 
before the trial thus making him unable to assist 
in his defense and making him impecunious, and 
then had him brought to court in handcuffs, failure 
to require the State to identify its witnesses even 
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on the day of trial, failure to try the jury panel 
question, failure to dismiss jurors challenged, 
failure to instruct the jury of defendants prP"'U!llr .. 
tion of innocence at the outs et of the trial, permitted 1 
prosecution to lead witnesses and make speeches 
to the jury and cut defense off, allowed prosecution 
to cross examine its own witness Harwood, refused 
to assist in securing the presence of a police officer 
for rebuttal the last day of trial, hurried the con-
clusion of the case and arguments, and refused a 
continuance to get 2 witnesses in order to get to a 
ball game. The Court failed to grant a mistrial for 
non-related crime evidence, refused to permit a 
recording of preliminary hearing testimony to be 
played to the jury, refused to admit the repair slip 
on defendant's car, refused a retrial and to sign a 
certificate of probable cause, and required Mr. 
Holloway to produce in court evidence to substan-
tiate his testimony and required defense to recall 
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him and refused to instruct as requested. 
Hardly any one of these errors alone 
'iC nld justify a new trial, but taken together and 
with the Court's repremanding of defense counsel 
and defense witnesses, the jury could not help but 
have been influenced and prejudiced against defen-
dant; and it is reasonably probable that a result 
more favorable to defendant would have been reached 
in the absence of the error complained of. Pacific 
Digest, Criminal Law, Key 1162; People v. Wardell, 
334 P. Zd 641, 167 C. A. Zd 560 (1959). 
POINT 4 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN ITS SELECTION, VOIR DIRE, AND 
INSTRUCTION OF THE JURY. 
As may be observed in the statement of 
fact and transcript the Court failed to try the jury 
panel question as required by the Utah Law. The 
jury was not a representative group as 8 of them 
had been robbed, one was a neighbor of defendant's 
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estranged wife, 2 of them had read all about defen-
dant' s prior case and possibly this one and one ex-
pressed a bias and another wanted to get back to liis 
business. 
The Court refused to inquire privately of 
the jury as to their knowledge. The law does not set 
out such a procedure nor deny such a right to defen-
dant. 
The jury was not advised (according to the 
record) of defendant's presumption of innocence at 
the outset of the case. 
The instruction on an accomplice's testi-
mony does not set out tests by which a jury could 
be expected to judge whether there is corroboration 
as would defendant's requested instruction. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant submits that the Supreme 
Court should reverse the conviction of guilty and 
dismiss the complaint as there is no evidence to 
link him to the crime of Gerald Rose except Gerald 
Rose. -34-
In the alternative defendant feels strongly 
ei'ough in his innocence and that the errors of the 
trial denied him a fair trial, that he is willing to 
risk 5 to 20 years in prison against his 6 month 
sentence for another trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
(' ;( 
DON L. BYBEE 
1414 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for 
Defendant-Appellant 
This is to stipulate that Defendant delivered 
2 copies of the above brief to the Attorney General on 
April 30, 1970, and that Defendant may file said brief 
\ I' • u 
Ji day. after the final dah with out prejudice,'), a 
a { { .i \.; \ 1 "-Lf:>-tW --{c; 
•!For Vernon Romney 
Attorney General 
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